Under Swiss law, protection of privacy entails both civil and criminal law mechanisms to protect a person’s honour, reputation and integrity from unlawful attacks. The case involving the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in Lucerne and former party member Yves Holenweger1 illustrates how media reports can be legally relevant and what options those affected have to protect themselves.
Civil law protection of personality rights
Civil law provides comprehensive protection of personality rights in accordance with Art. 28 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code. This protection covers physical and psychological aspects, as well as honour, privacy and economic reputation.
- A violation is considered unlawful if it is not justified by consent, higher interests or the law.
- Those affected may demand that the violation be stopped, remedied or determined by a court.
- Claims for damages, compensation or counterstatements are also often available, especially in the case of media publications.
In the case of media-effective criticism, as in the present case, the person concerned can, for example, demand a counterstatement or take legal action to prevent and remove a defamatory statement.
Criminal law protection of personal rights
Criminal law applies in cases of particularly serious violations of personal rights, such as defamation, slander or verbal abuse.
- Defamation (Art. 173 SCC): Anyone who accuses another person of dishonourable or reprehensible behaviour to third parties may be prosecuted if the statement is not proven or justified. A criminal offence is therefore committed when someone spreads false information about another person that damages their reputation. In such cases, the public prosecutor’s office may issue a penalty order, as was done in the case mentioned above.
- Willful Defamation (Art. 174 SCC): Anyone who, against their better judgement, accuses or suspects someone of dishonourable behaviour or spreads such accusations may be prosecuted if these accusations damage the person’s reputation. The deliberate dissemination of false facts that cast a person in a bad light is therefore punishable by law. This offence is more serious and can lead to higher penalties.
- Criminal prosecution protects the right to honour and reputation and also includes protection against damage to reputation in public and media reporting.
- Negligent or deliberate false statements are punishable by fines or even imprisonment.
Here too, the person affected can initiate civil proceedings in parallel in order to additionally mitigate the consequences of a criminal offence under civil law.
Effective protection of privacy: Legal action and recommended measures in cases of defamation, damage to reputation and media coverage
The example of the defamatory press release signed by Dieter Haller, then president of the Lucerne City SVP, and Timo Lichtsteiner, then and now vice-president, illustrates how personality rights protection works.
- Those affected by defamatory statements or media reports should promptly check whether there is a justifiable reason and, if not, consider seeking legal assistance for civil and criminal proceedings.
- Particularly in the case of political criticism or public reporting, it is essential to carefully weigh up the interests involved (freedom of expression vs. protection of personality rights) – courts often weigh up the public interest against the rights of the individual.
The Holenweger affair shows how personal attacks can quickly turn into a legal dispute over honour and personality rights. A specialised law firm offers competent support in dealing with such complex cases and ensures that the rights and interests of those affected are protected in an objective and efficient manner.
Find out more about the protection of personality rights in civil and criminal law here.
- https://www.luzernerzeitung.ch/zentralschweiz/stadt-region-luzern/artikel-ld.4016595 last visited on 23 September, 2025. ↩︎
In its ruling, the court refuses to unseal seized data carriers and documents belonging to a journalist, thereby strengthening freedom of press. The current decision of the Zurich District Court of 2 July 2025 deals with the unsealing of seized data carriers and documents in the case of Inside Paradeplatz journalist Lukas Hässig, after the journalist correctly filed for sealing on the grounds of protecting his sources. The decision of the Compulsory Measures Court shows the conditions under which a request for unsealing is approved or, as in this case, not approved.
Facts and background of the Hässig case
The focus is on an investigative journalist, editor of the Inside Paradeplatz platform. He is accused of sharing information and data from Bank Julius Bär & Co. AG, which is subject to banking secrecy and/or trade secrets, in his magazine ‘Inside Paradeplatz’. In connection with the resumption of criminal proceedings against the respondent for an offence under Article 47 Banking Act, a search was carried out at his home and place of work. Various items and data carriers were seized. Referring to the protection of journalistic sources, the respondent requested that all seized items be sealed.
The public prosecutor’s office then filed a request for unsealing with the Compulsory Measures Court of the Zurich District Court. The respondent commented on the request for unsealing and requested that it be dismissed.
Note: The judgment shows that the criminal investigation by the public prosecutor’s office had already been suspended twice. In the most recent suspension order, the public prosecutor’s office itself had denied the admissibility of a search on the grounds of source protection, which the court took up in its judgment.
Legal requirements for unsealing
A request for sealing is used to assert permissible confidentiality interests pursuant to Article 248 para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code when searching records. Once the request for sealing has been filed, the criminal authority first seals the seized data carriers and documents. In the unsealing proceedings, the Compulsory Measures Court is then obliged to examine any objections to the admissibility of the search. A general decision must therefore be made as to whether the search is admissible.
A search of records within the meaning of Article 246 ff. Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, i.e. ‘documents, audio, video and other recordings, data carriers and equipment for processing and storing information’, is permissible if:
- The items are subject to a seizure (Art. 246 Swiss Criminal Procedure Code)
- There is sufficient suspicion of a crime (Art. 197 para. 1 lit. b Swiss Criminal Procedure Code)
- It is proportionate with regard to the constitutionally protected sphere of intimacy and privacy (Art. 197 para. 1 lit. c Swiss Criminal Procedure Code)
According to Article 246 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, documents, audio, video and other recordings, data carriers and equipment for processing and storing information may only be searched if there is reason to suspect that information subject to seizure is contained in these items. According to Article 263 para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, items and assets that are used as evidence (lit. a) are subject to seizure if they are needed to secure procedural costs, fines, penalties and compensation (lit. b), if they are to be returned to the injured party (lit. c), confiscated (lit. d) or used to cover claims for compensation by the state in accordance with Article 71 of the Swiss Criminal Code.
Unlike the court of law, the Compulsory Measures Court does not have to exhaustively weigh up all incriminating and exonerating evidence. What is required is a sufficiently concrete probability that the alleged offence was actually committed. According to the highest court ruling, reasonable suspicion can be equated with the concept of initial suspicion pursuant to Article 309 para. 1 lit. a of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code.
Compared to pre-trial detention (Art. 224 ff. Swiss Criminal Procedure Code), the unsealing and searching of records appears to be significantly less intrusive. The requirements for reasonable suspicion are therefore less stringent. Reference can be made to substantiated criminal complaints or reports. The grounds for suspicion must be examined on the basis of the results of the investigation to date.
Furthermore, the Compulsory Measures Court must weigh up the interests involved and examine whether the house search and the search of the sealed data are proportionate to the constitutionally protected intimate and private sphere of the respondent.
The owner of the records or objects may request sealing if there are obstacles to seizure in accordance with Article 264 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 248 Swiss Criminal Procedure Code). These obstacles to seizure also prevent the unsealing of previously sealed records and objects.
When assessing the proportionality of this compulsory measure, the severity of the offences under investigation is also taken into account (Art. 197 para. 1 lit. d Swiss Criminal Procedure Code).
Considerations of the coercive measures court in its ruling of 2 July 2025
No reasonable suspicion
The criminal investigation against the respondent has now been ongoing for six years. The investigation files do not indicate that the suspicion against the respondent has intensified in recent years or at least months. The Compulsory Measures Court finds that no suspicion against the respondent can be established, even to a minimal degree. Sufficient suspicion is denied.
Proportionality and source protection
The public prosecutor’s office argues that the respondent cannot invoke source protection under Art. 28a para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Art. 172 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code and thus a right to refuse to give evidence. The Compulsory Measures Court argues that the respondent acted in the interests of society and fulfilled his duty as an investigative journalist. It considers the priority given to criminal prosecution and possible punishment for a breach of banking secrecy over the legitimate right of the public to be informed about alleged far-reaching violations of the law in the financial sector to be manifestly wrong. According to the Compulsory Measures Court, the interest in prosecution in this case is not sufficiently weighty to outweigh the protection of sources. The proportionality of the search must also be denied.
Finally, the Compulsory Measures Court finds that the conditions for unsealing and searching the seized data carriers and documents are not met.
Significance for the media, lawyers and those affected
The ruling thus rightly emphasises the high hurdles for interference in journalistic work. Source protection enjoys strong protection in Switzerland, as it is enshrined in the Constitution and the ECHR. Finally, criminal proceedings such as the unsealing and searching of records require careful consideration of the interests involved – especially in the case of media professionals.
For affected journalists and media companies, this means that access to confidential data is only permitted in exceptional cases where there are concrete and serious grounds for suspicion of criminal activity.
Our law firm provides advice on criminal procedure law, media law, source protection and the enforcement of personal rights. Please feel free to contact us without obligation if you have any questions about criminal proceedings and the search of records.
FAQ Criminal proceedings and sealing:
- How does the sealing of data carriers or documents occur in criminal proceedings?
Seized data carriers or documents are sealed if the person concerned claims that the contents of the records are subject to special protection, for example due to professional secrecy (e.g. protection of journalistic sources, lawyers, doctors). Sealed data may only be searched after a court decision has been made.
- Under what conditions can a request for unsealing be successful?
To this end, the public prosecutor’s office submits a request for unsealing to the Compulsory Measures Court. Unsealing is possible if there is concrete and sufficient suspicion against the person concerned and the search appears proportionate to their fundamental rights. The Compulsory Measures Court always examines the proportionality and the suspicion.
- What is the right to refuse to give evidence and who can invoke it?
The right to refuse to give evidence allows certain professional groups – e.g. lawyers, journalists, doctors – to refuse to testify and to keep their sources or client data confidential. This protection applies as long as they are not suspected of having committed serious crimes themselves.
The right to refuse to give evidence allows any person to refuse to testify during questioning for their own protection (Art. 169 Swiss Criminal Procedure Code) or to protect personal relationships such as their spouse or close relatives (Art. 168 Swiss Criminal Procedure Code). However, sealing is only protected under Art. 264 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code in cases of qualified confidentiality protection, e.g. items and documents from another person’s communications with their lawyer.
- Is the protection of journalists’ sources also guaranteed in court?
Yes, journalists can invoke source protection. Courts and public prosecutors may only seize and unseal their data in exceptional cases – namely when there are clear indications of a criminal offence and public interests, namely in the criminal investigation, outweigh other considerations.
- What can I do if I receive a summons to appear as a witness but wish to refuse to provide information?
You must attend the appointment, but you can exercise your right to refuse to give evidence if you are bound to secrecy as a relative or because of your profession. Inform the authorities of this in good time and seek legal advice if necessary.
Switzerland is strengthening its claim to be one of Europe’s leading centres of innovation. ETH Zurich plays a central role in this as a driving force. Three recent developments emphasise the country’s technological potential and digital sovereignty (personal selection):
- the development of a publicly accessible large language model (LLM) for data protection-compliant AI applications,
- ETH’s participation in the Swiss Chip Fablab to strengthen national semiconductor expertise in the Dübendorf Innovation Park,
- and the initiative surrounding the ETH Earth Observation Centre in the Canton of Lucerne, which is providing targeted impetus in Central Switzerland.
All projects symbolise an innovation strategy based on scientific excellence as well as entrepreneurial scalability, sustainable infrastructure and regulatory foresight.
Digital sovereignty: The ETH large language model for public use
The LLM, launched by ETH Zurich, is the first AI technology to be tailored to Swiss legal requirements, multilingualism and the highest data protection standards. It is the result of a collaboration between EPFL and ETH Zurich and was trained on the ‘Alps’ supercomputer at the Swiss National Supercomputing Centre (CSCS). For companies, administrations and, in particular, SMEs that value data-secure processes, this opens up new possibilities in the areas of automation, information indexing and modern customer interaction – without having to rely on global cloud platforms. This development illustrates how technological progress and location policy can be combined. Switzerland is thus positioning itself as a pioneer for trustworthy and independent digitalisation in both the public and private sectors.
Semiconductor expertise in the heart of Europe: the Swiss Chip Fablab
ETH Zurich is also marking a milestone in the area of hardware and semiconductor development: the planned participation in the Swiss Chip Fablab in the Dübendorf Innovation Park will create a network that combines research, development and production at a geopolitically secure, reliable location. The aim is to strengthen the resilience of supply chains and establish independent semiconductor expertise – a key concern in times of global uncertainty. It does not serve as an alternative to AI processor chips, which are predominantly manufactured in Taiwan, but rather to develop highly specialised chips for applications such as energy, mobility, medicine or communication. The Fablab offers start-ups, established companies and international partners access to state-of-the-art infrastructure, support with regulatory issues and the opportunity for strategic networking.
New ETH hub for the canton of Lucerne: strengthening the region and promoting innovation
Thanks to the CHF 100 million donation from the Jörg G. Bucherer Foundation to the ETH, an earth observation centre is to be built in the canton of Lucerne. Emmen/Viscosistadt, Horw around the University of Applied Sciences or Hochdorf are being discussed, for example. This shows how the power of innovation can be strengthened in a targeted manner and promoted in a decentralised manner. Such an ETH hub creates new opportunities for companies and start-ups in Central Switzerland to enter into direct dialogue with research and teaching – and sends out a strong signal for the attractiveness of Emmen as a location for technology and innovation. The regional anchoring of technological excellence contributes to the broad development of innovation potential and the utilisation of synergies between science and business.
What does this mean for companies, investors and entrepreneurs?
For technology-orientated companies, investors and innovative entrepreneurs, new opportunities for collaboration arise, but also complex regulatory issues:
- How can AI solutions be integrated in a legally compliant and data protection-compliant manner?
- What legal requirements need to be observed when researching, developing and exporting sensitive technologies?
- How can innovation and compliance be optimally balanced in international competition?
As a boutique law firm from Lucerne specialising in data protection law, digital business models and commercial law issues, we assist companies, authorities and institutions with all the challenges of digital transformation. Our team supports you in all matters relating to data protection and IT projects, as well as in commercial law issues such as corporate governance, restructuring and M&A. We emphasise legally compliant innovation, regulatory compliance and pragmatic implementation. From data protection impact assessments and licence agreements to cross-company transformation, you benefit from our expertise in the digital and business environment.
Contact us for questions about digital business models.
From 1 June 2025, the principle of public access will apply in the Canton of Lucerne. This marks a significant step towards greater transparency and democratic oversight within the cantonal administration: citizens, journalists, and businesses will, in principle, have access to official information and documents held by the administration — without the need to demonstrate a specific interest. Lucerne is thus the last Swiss canton to implement this important reform.
What does the principle of public access mean?
The principle of public access obliges authorities to make official documents and information available upon request. Access may only be refused if there are compelling reasons — such as the protection of personal data or other legally protected interests. The burden of justification to refuse access lies with the authority. This new right strengthens transparency, democratic oversight, and the formation of public opinion in the Canton of Lucerne.
Limitations: Data Protection and Privacy
The principle of public access is limited where the protection of personal data is concerned. Personal data is protected by constitutional rights to privacy and by the Cantonal Data Protection Act (KDSG). If an official document contains personal data relating to third parties, the administration must carefully weigh the interests involved: does the public interest in transparency outweigh the private interest in confidentiality? As a rule, personal data must be anonymised. If anonymisation is not possible, either consent or a balancing of interests is required.
Practical Challenges and Anonymisation
Anonymising personal data in official documents is a complex task. Due to modern research tools and the abundance of publicly accessible data, there is a risk that seemingly anonymised information can still be linked to specific individuals. The use of identifying features such as social security numbers (AHV numbers) further complicates effective anonymisation. Administrative bodies must therefore exercise particular care to ensure that data protection and transparency are appropriately balanced.
Decentralised Implementation in the Canton of Lucerne
The legal provisions on the principle of public access and data protection are spread across various statutes in the Canton of Lucerne. Requests for access are processed in a decentralised manner by the respective administrative bodies. An interdepartmental committee is intended to ensure uniform practice. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether equality of treatment and data protection can be guaranteed in every individual case.
Our firm has proven expertise in administrative law, data protection, and the practical application of the principle of public access. We support citizens, businesses, journalists, and authorities with requests for access to official documents—from the initial application and the balancing of interests to representation in appeal proceedings.
Get in touch with us for an initial consultation on matters of Public Access.
On Monday, 12 May 2025, Matthias R. Schönbächler, former Data Protection Officer of the Canton of Lucerne, was officially bid farewell by the Lucerne Cantonal Council. Schönbächler held the office from 2018 to 2024 and supported the handover to his successor Natascha Ofner-Venetz in 2025.
In his tribute, Ferdinand Zehnder President of the Cantonal Parliament emphasised Schönbächler’s pioneering work in setting up the cantonal data protection supervisory authority. This task was successfully mastered with legal precision and technical understanding.
As a lawyer with impressively broad specialist knowledge and, as he himself described it, competence in technical dialogue, Matthias Schönbächler combined legal precision with technical understanding
– Ferdinand Zehnder, President of the Cantonal Parliament
The video recording of the Cantonal Parliament session of 12 May 2025 is available on the Cantonal website: https://www.lu.ch/kr/Sessionen/videoaufnahmen?keyword=Session&sessionoverview=true
After these words of praise, the President of the Cantonal Parliament thanked Matthias R. Schönbächler on behalf of the Cantonal Parliament for his many years of service to the Canton of Lucerne.
We would also like to thank Matthias R. Schönbächler for his services to data protection and administrative development in the Canton of Lucerne. Our special thanks also go to the Lucerne Cantonal Council and State Secretary Vinc Blaser for their honourable farewell.
Presently there is no dedicated Artificial Intelligence (AI) legislation in Switzerland. Nevertheless, given the ever increasing adoption and use of AI tools in various sectors – in particular in finance, the risks associated with such systems would inevitably require thorough scrutiny.
To this end, the Swiss Financial Markets Authority (FINMA) has recently[i] published a set of findings and observations which take a risk-based approach defined from operational, data-related, IT and cyber alongside legal and reputational perspectives. The supervised entities would therefore need to identify, assess, monitor, manage and control the risks associated with their AI applications, either as an in-house development or outsourced, and to make sure these are aligned and reflected in their respective governance models.
Above all, FINMA highlights operational risks such as lack of robustness, correctness, bias and explainability, the risks associated with third party service providers as well as challenges in the allocation of responsibilities and accountability as the most compelling issues.
Once identified, the ‘materiality’ of the risks in question would need to be determined. In other words, to define whether a given AI application may carry a higher threshold in cases where it “…is used to comply with supervisory law or to perform critical functions, or when customers or employees are strongly affected by its results”.
From the perspective of date-related risks, it is apparent that incorrect, inconsistent, incomplete, unrepresentative or outdated data would undermine the credibility and effectiveness of an AI application. Therefore, certain measures would need to be put in place to ensure input data integrity and that the availability of and access to data is secured. On the other hand, FINMA refers to regular checks in order to detect data drifts, and to validation methods in order to guarantee ongoing quality of output data.
Lastly, it is noted that explainability of results would be critical for an effective assessment of an AI application, whereby the drivers of a given application and its behaviour under varying circumstances and conditions would need to be comprehensible even to non-experts such as clients, investors and supervisory authorities etc. For those applications carrying higher ‘materiality’, the results of an independent review forming an informed and unbiased opinion as to the reliability of the application in question would also need to be taken into account in the development phase of that application.
[i] See here https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2024/12/20241218-mm-finma-am-08-24/.
The new FINMA circular 2025/2 on rules of conduct under the Financial Services Act (FinSA) and Financial Services Ordinance (FinSO) which is set to enter into force on 1 January 2025[i] aims to put together a series of uniform standards for the provision of information and support of clients in the financial services sector.
A transitional period until 30 June 2025 is introduced for the implementation of certain requirements.
The circular will essentially be applicable to banks and security firms, managers of collective assets, companies with provision of fund management as well as portfolio management services. Therefore, those financial service providers which are not subject to FINMA supervision would in principle fall outside of the scope of the circular.
In a nutshell, a number of points as follows.
- With regards to the corporate finance exceptions applied by FinSO, the circular clarifies that “buy-side” services, distinguished from “sell-side” services, namely the offering of financial instruments to investors, respectively their sale to clients would fall under the scope of FinSA.
- Duty of service providers to provide information to clients with regards to a) the nature of investment advice as being transaction based, alternatively portfolio based; b) the risks concerning contracts for difference (CFD) and c) the risk concentrations in provision of portfolio management and portfolio based investment advisory services.
- As part of the appropriateness and suitability requirement, service providers must collect information on the knowledge and experience of private clients concerning each investment category on offer.
- Duty of service providers to inform clients of the use of their ‘own’ financial instruments, alternatively those of a third party or a combination of both, in the context of rendering their services, and to ensure appropriate organisational measures in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest as much as possible. In exceptional cases where the conflict of interest becomes unavoidable, service providers are bound by disclosure requirements.
- Duty of service providers to properly disclose third party compensation (retrocession) to clients and to ensure details are highlighted in standardised contracts.
- In cases where service providers may borrow financial instruments from their clients’ portfolios as a counterparty, respectively act as an agent for those transactions, prior and express consent must in general be collected from the clients, in consonance with FinSA. The circular now lists a minimum set of information to be made available to the clients for their consent in this context to be considered valid.
[i] See here https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2024/11/20241121-mm-rs-verhaltenspflichten-fidleg/.
On 17 October 2024[i] the European Commission adopted the first implementing rules of cybersecurity of critical entities and networks, in consonance with the NIS2 Directive, in the form of an Implementing Regulation.[ii] The Regulation is set to come into force in late November, to be precise 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal – which took place on 7 November 2024.
The adoption of the Regulation also coincides with the last day of the deadline set for the EU Member States to transpose the NIS2 Directive into their national laws.
The implementing rules essentially detail measures pertaining to cybersecurity risk management, and reporting obligations to national authorities across the bloc which are imposed on companies providing digital infrastructures and services in the event “significant” incidents may occur. Specifically, those companies with provision of digital services for instance cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking platforms would fall under the scope.
NIS2 Directive[iii] re-categories and noticeably expands the previous scope, which initially covered two categories of i) operators of essential services (OESs) and ii) relevant digital service providers (RDSPs), by classifying covered entities under either Essential Entities (EE) or Important Entities (IE).
EE includes sectors of energy, transport, finance, public administration, health, space, water supply and digital infrastructure such as cloud computing service providers and ICT management.
IE includes sectors of postal services, waste management, chemicals, research organisations, food processing, manufacturing and digital providers such as social networks, search engines and online marketplaces.
With micro and small entities in principle excluded from the scope, the Directive puts in place a size threshold. In other words, a threshold of 250 employees, annual turnover of €50 million or balance sheet of €43 million concerning the EE entities, respectively a threshold of 50 employees, annual turnover of €10 million or balance sheet of €10 million concerning those under the IE list.
Nevertheless, an entity may still be considered as ‘essential’ or ‘important’ irrespective of its size, if it is the sole provider of a critical service for societal or economic activity in a given Member State, respectively a trust service provider or any central or regional government entity.
Similar to GDPR, the Directive requires Member States to impose penalties for non-compliance, the ratio of which would differ per classification. €10 million or at least 2% of global annual turnover for the previous fiscal year, whichever is higher, for the EE entities, respectively €7 million or at least 1.4% of global annual turnover for the previous fiscal year, whichever is higher, for the IE entities.
Notably, the covered entities’ management bodies, such as board of directors, would also be held liable for non-compliance.
On the other hand, the Swiss Information Security Act (Informationssicherheitsgesetz, ISG) applies primarily to the federal administration, cantonal authorities and their partner companies in the country, and its revised version is set to come into force by 1 January 2025. In this context, partner companies could be active in similar sectors as those within the scope of the Directive in the EU, such as financial and information and communication sectors as well as those service providers and manufacturers of hardware and software products that are used by critical infrastructures.
Therefore, supplier companies would indirectly fall under the scope of ISG, similar to that of the Directive in the EU. The Swiss entities forming part of a supply chain which ultimately target those EU based entities covered by the Directive, would as a result be affected by the requirements and obligations under both instruments.
Specifically, the subsidiaries and branches of Swiss entities registered within the EU, which fall under either of the EE or IE classifications, will have to comply with the Directive in the EU and comply with the requirement to register with the national authority of an affiliated Member State, among other things. In this scenario, the parent or affiliated entity in Switzerland may also be indirectly caught under the radar of the Directive through the supply chain connection.
[i] See here https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5342.
[ii] See here https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2690/oj.